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Recently Wo´jcik has analyzed the security of the ’ping-pong’ quantum communication proto-
col[1] in the case of considerable quantum channel losses and accordingly an undetectable eaves-
dropping scheme and possible improvements on the ’ping-pong’ protocol are proposed [2]. This is
true. However, in his paper, there exist some mistakes, i.e., the mutual information I, quantum
bit error rate (QBER) and secure transmission efficiency are incorrect. In this paper, I would like
to point out them and correct them.
First, I would like to present a simple question and an obvious fact:
(a) In Wojcik’s paper, Bob’s QBER (quantum bits error rate) is precisely 1/4. Then one would
like to ask how many wrong bits in Bob’s bits provided that the total bit number N is odd or 2n+2.
Assuming N=201,202,203, whether the corresponding answers are 50.25,50.50,50.75 respectively?
If so, how ridiculous they are for the numbers of the wrong bits are noninteger. It is the wrong
QBER=1/4 that leads to the ridiculous results.
(b) According to Wojcik’s figure 4, one can find when the channel transmission efficiency is zero,
both Eve and Bob still can get informations from Alice and Eve’s is larger than Bob’s. This is like
that, when I call you and speak aloud for a quite long time disregarding the status of the phone,
although the phoneline is cutted at the very beginning, you still can get some information from
me. Another ridiculous result!
All these have obviously shown that there are mistakes in Wojcik’s paper.
I strongly suspect Wojick’s conclusion (i.e., Eve’s mutual information with Alice’s is not de-
creased for she exactly knows whether the symmetry operation is performed or not, while Bob’s
mutual information with Alice’s is decreased for he does not know whether the symmetry op-
eration is performed. Alternatively, in Wojcik’s original words, ’It should be emphasized that
symmetrization disturbs the communication between Alice and Bob in such a way that mutual
information is reduced while the QBER is not affected’). Here I offer a verification of my suspicion
via simple examples. Additionally, in these examples the doubtful QBER=1/4 question can also
be addressed.
Let ’u’ denote Eve’s attack without the symmetry operation and ’s’ be Eve’s attack with the
symmetry operation. Suppose Alice’s bit be ’1001’. If Bob gets ’1000’ after his measurements,
one can easily work out the mutual information between Bob and Alice IAB = 0.311 and Bob’s
QBER=1/4. The calculations are completely determined by Bob’s bits and Alice’s bits disregard-
ing the intermediate process by Eve. In fact, after any one of the ’uuuu’,’susu’,’ssuu’ or ’ussu’
attacks by Eve, it is possible for Bob to get ’1000’. So one can easily find that after the symmetry
2operations (e.g.,’susu’, ’ssuu’ and ’ussu’) the mutual information between Bos and Alice is not re-
duced at all. This indicates that Wojcik’s correspoding conclusion is wrong. Although the QBER
in the above example is 1/4, in fact, Bob’s QBER is not always 1/4 at all. This can be seen from
the following example. Also suppose Alice’s bits be ’1001’. It is possible for Bob to get ’1001’
after any one of the ’uuuu’, ’ssss’, ’suus’, ’susu’, ’ssuu’, ’usus’, ussu’ or ’uuss’ attacks by Eve. In
any one of these cases, the IAB = 1 while the QBER=0. This example also verifies that Wojcik’s
conclusion is wrong. In fact, it is possible for Bob to get different bits after his measurements.
Generally speaking, different bits correspond to different mutual information and different QBER.
This conclusion is different from Wojcik’s given mutual information and given QBER.
I would like to say the essential reason which leads to Wojcik’s is the inappropriate use of the
mutual information. He has made a confusion of the mutual information of single-bit-gain and the
mutual information of multi-bits-gain. Also he should notice in reality the number of Alice’s bits
is finite.
As for discussions on the secure transmission efficiency, one can also see my manuscript quant-
ph-0402022.
In Wojcik’s paper, according to the analysis on the mutual information I as a function of the
transmission efficiency η of the quantum channel, Wo´jcik concludes that the ’ping-pong’ protocol
is not secure for η < 60%. Here I would like to point out that this conclusion is not reliable.
The mutual information in Wojcik’s paper is only and essentially a single-time- statistic mutual
information. This physical quantity is used inappropriately in Wojcik’s paper to stand for the
mutual information of the whole transmissions (multi times), alternatively, the mutual informa-
tions of the whole transmissions (multi times) are not worked out appropriately ( It is not suitable
to calculate the mutual informations by using the so-called joint probability distributions as the
equation 7 in Wo´jcik’s paper). Since the number N of Alice’s transmitted bits is finite in reality,
generally speaking, after the whole transmissions, it is quite possible that APD (probability dis-
tributions which can be and should be extracted from all the Alice’s, Bob’s and Eve’s bits) are
different from SPD (probability distributions suitable for the single bit gain). The larger N , the
more possibly APD are close to SPD. Only when N is infinite, APD are equal to SPD.
Consider the case that η ≤ 50% (i.e., Eve can attack all the bits). Suppose Alice’s transmitted
and attacked bits be ′1011000101 . . .′. When Alice sends the first bit ’1’, according to Wo´jcik’s
scheme, it is possible for Bob to get ’1’ and for Eve to get ’0’ by measurements. Also it is possible
for Bob to get ’0’ and for Eve to get ’1’. Certainly there are other possibilities. Similar results
occur for other transmitted bits. So after Alice transmits the bits one by one, it is possible for
Bob to get ′1011000101 . . .′. This means that it is possible for Bob to get same bits with Alice’s
provided that N is finite (In reality N should be finite). This denies Wo´jcik’s conclusion that
IAE is always bigger than IAB when η ≤ 50% (cf. figure 4 in Wo´jcik’s paper). Additionally, it
is unimaginable that according to the figure 4 both IAE and IAB are nonzero and IAE > IAB
when η = 0. Of course, similarly, it is also possible for Eve to get the same bits with Alice’s when
N is finite. In the case that N is infinite IAE = IAB can be arrived at. All these mean that
the ping-pong protocol is really not secure when η ≤ 50%. Still in the case that N is infinite,
when η is larger than 50%, then only a fraction of all the transmitted bits can be attacked by Eve
3and accordingly IAB > IAE . The forking point is η = 50%. This means that the corresponding
conclusion in Wo´jcik’s paper is wrong. In reality N should be finite. In this case, for all the
attacked bits, it is possible for Eve to get the same ones with Alice’s. Therefore, if a condition that
the number of the Bob’s correct bits is not less than the number of Eve’s correct bits is required, it
is easy to work out that η should be not less than 75%. This means that in reality the ping-pong
protocol is not secure for η ≤ 75%.
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